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6.1 Introduction and Methodology
The 1970s have seen not only a deterioration in the average mac-
roeconomic performance of the industrialized countries but also in-
creased dispersion about that average. For example, as the unweighted
average inflation rate of a group of ten leading industrialized countries
rose from 4.0 percent during 1963-70 to 8.9 percent during 1971-79, the
dispersion of inflation rates as measured by the unweighted standard
deviation rose from 0.8 percent to 2.5 percent. Similarly, as the un-
weighted average unemployment rate among eight of the same countries
rose from 2.7 percent during 1964-70 to 4.3 percent during 1971-79, its
dispersion rose from 1.5 percent to 1.9 percent.
1
While the increased dispersion of inflation rates has clearly led to and
been associated with increased flexibility in exchange rates, it also
appears to have led, at least in part, to the increased levels and dispersion
of unemployment rates, as high-inflation countries have often been
forced to adopt restrictive macroeconomic policies.
The various factors contributing to the increased dispersion in mac-
roeconomic performance can be divided into differences in internal and
external economic shocks hitting different countries, differences in the
economic structures of different countries, such as openness, degree of
indexation of wages, dependence on oil imports, etc., and differences in
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monetary and fiscal policies, as well as other policies followed by the
countries in question.
Other authors have concentrated their efforts on differences in eco-
nomic structures, and it is clear that these have a major role in explaining
both differences in responses to external factors, such as the oil price
increases of 1974 or 1979-80, and differences in the effectiveness of
different types of economic policies (Argy and Spitaeller 1980; Sachs
1979). The main hypothesis underlying this paper is that even if distur-
bances and economic structures were constant across countries, differ-
ences in the utilization of economic policies would lead to differences in
performance.
Now it is quite clear that there is a relationship between the effective-
ness of policies, which depends on economic structure, and their utiliza-
tion. Ineffective policies should be little utilized, one suspects. Thus
cross-country comparisons of the utilization of policies should be related
to differences in economic structure. In future work such comparisons
will be undertaken.
The purpose of this paper is to seek to quantify systematically differ-
ences in the utilization of monetary policy instruments among ten leading
industrialized countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States). Past cross-country studies of this nature have used graphical,
tabular, and verbal chronologies of monetary policy instruments and
targets over some given time period (Michaely 1971; Thygesen and
Shigehara 1975; Black 1977). The technique, while highly useful, suffers
an inevitable lack of precision. While there are numerous econometric
studies of individual country monetary policy reaction functions, a sys-
tematic cross-country study seems to have not been done.
The methodology of the study is in principle straightforward but in-
volves some econometric complications. It is assumed in section 6.2 that
the monetary authorities behave as if they maximize an intertemporal
welfare function subject to an implicit perceived econometric model of
the private economy. The process is assumed to yield a set of policy
reaction functions relating the policy instruments directly under the
authorities' control, such as the discount rate, reserve requirements,
open market operations, and lending to commercial banks, to a set of
internal and external target variables, such as inflation, unemployment,
and the balance of payments and/or the exchange rate.
Despite the frequent use by economists of market-determined vari-
ables, such as the rate of growth of the money supply or short-term
interest rates, as "instruments" of central banks, I believe that the term
should be limited to variables which are actually in the hands of the
authorities. There is an extensive literature on the use of "intermediate"191 Monetary Policy for Internal and External Balance
targets, such as the money supply or short-term interest rates, as a means
of influencing the ultimate targets (for a recent discussion, see Bryant
1980). Since these intermediate targets have little or no welfare signifi-
cance in and of themselves, they cannot be used in the welfare function to
represent the factors motivating policy choices.
On the other hand, they might be used as measures of the policy
intentions of the authorities, that is, as instruments. Unfortunately, both
market interest rates and money supplies are jointly determined by policy
and the markets. Therefore, at most they can be regarded as intermediate
targets in a two-stage strategy of monetary control (Bryant, 1980, chap.
15). The complexities of successfully modeling such two-stage strategies
for several different countries does not recommend itself to this re-
searcher. In any event, the intermediate target is in actuality only a veil
between the actual levers of policy and the ultimate targets. While it is
true, as Bryant has argued, that the intermediate target may be pursued
myopically and therefore take on an independent life of its own (as target
or instrument?), it seems simpler to treat such behavior as a shift in the
use of the actual instruments. Thus, one can add the monetary growth
target to the independent variables in the reaction function to see if it has
independent effects.
Within a reaction function framework, one must allow for lags in the
adjustment of various instruments that are adjusted only discretely, such
as discount rates, credit controls, and reserve requirements. A threshold
regression technique is developed in appendix A and is used to capture
this phenomenon which appears to be rather widespread.
A further complication is that standardized reaction functions are
being applied to a widely differing set of monetary policy instruments in
each country. Given a decision to use the actual instruments under the
control of the authorities, the researcher must then study the institutional
characteristics of the monetary system in each country (Hodgman 1974;
Holbik 1973). It would be desirable to define instruments as uniformly as
possible for purposes of cross-country comparisons. Discount rates are
reasonably uniform, but other instruments, such as credit controls, re-
serve requirements, discount quotas, and open market operations, differ
substantially across countries. Perhaps the best approach might be to
convert such measures into their equivalent effect on the reserve base,
but even that is not possible for credit controls.
Changes in the operating techniques of monetary policy clearly must be
incorporated into the analysis, either by combining instruments that are
used alternatively at different times or else by dummy variables of some
type. A more general version of this issue arises in the context of the
assignment problem discussed below. It is possible to argue that multiple
monetary instruments are unnecessary and that estimates of these coef-192 Stanley W. Black
ficients would be unstable. However, if the authorities are uncertain
about the economic structure, it is likely that they would prefer to use a
variety of instruments jointly rather than rely on only one.
In one sense, reaction functions are bound to be unstable, since we
know they change with changes in policy preferences (welfare functions)
and with changes in economic structure (pegged versus floating rates,
etc.). The study of this instability is, in fact, one of the reasons for
examining reaction functions.
Taking shifts in political power into account is an essential part of
estimating policy reaction functions. However, the researcher must avoid
the appearance of ex post justification of large residuals by convenient
dummy variables. Therefore, the proper approach is to go through a
source (such as Keesing's Contemporary Archives) systematically and
note down all potentially significant political changes, keeping the num-
ber relatively small.
Several types of dummy variable techniques may be used to test for the
effects of shifts in political power. A simple additive dummy tests for
changes in the "target" values of the variables entering the welfare
function. Dummy variables on the slope coefficients of the reaction
functions test for shifts in the relative weights in the welfare function, as
well as for possible differences in the underlying perceived model of the
economy. Most generally, split samples can be used to test for differences
in the entire policy reaction function, if enough data are available on each
political regime. The latter two tests may be regarded as measuring the
"interaction" effects of political and economic variables on economic
policy behavior. Appendix B briefly summarizes the relevant instruments
in each country and takes note of shifts in the use of such instruments over
time. Finally, shifts in political power can lead to shifts both in welfare
functions and in the economic environment faced by decisionmakers.
These factors, too, are discussed where relevant in appendix B.
The results of the study, in the form of a series of reaction functions for
each country, are presented and discussed in section 6.4 of the paper.
Conclusions are suggested in section 6.5.
6.2 A Model of Central Bank Behavior
While there is little reason to believe that central banks actually use
formal optimization techniques except for illustrative studies, the usual
"as if" assumption will justify modeling their behavior as the solution of
an optimal control problem with a multiperiod welfare criterion (Chow
1975). I would emphasize that it is not necessary to believe that the
policymakers actually use these tools. In particular, it is not necessary to
believe that the actual policies chosen are optimal, unless one wants to
solve the "inverse" problem and estimate the parameters of the welfare193 Monetary Policy for Internal and External Balance
function as explained by Chow (1981, chap. 16) and Friedlaender (1972).
This argument rests on the use of theory as an approximation to reality
and becomes suspect only when the underlying theory is inadequate to
describe the phenomena in question.
The Lucas critique (1976) of econometric policymaking and the "new
classical macroeconomics" of the rational expectations school might lead
one to doubt the adequacy of the macroeconomic theory underlying
central bank policy reaction functions. If, for example, it is true that
monetary policy has no systematic effect on the real variables of the
economy, then a theory of monetary policy which assumes the contrary
may seriously mislead the policymakers. On the other hand, it appears
that tests with recent macroeconomic data are unable to distinguish
between the "new classical" hypotheses and the neo-Keynesian hypoth-
eses embodied in most central bank econometric models (Sargent 1976).
Under these circumstances, it seems unlikely that reaction functions
which hypothesize a Keynesian world will be seriously in error as descrip-
tions of behavior.
Specification of the targets entering the welfare function is on the
surface quite simple. Inflation, unemployment, and the balance of pay-
ments are enshrined as goals in both textbook and central bank guide-
lines. Unfortunately, there are several problems in making these targets
explicit. First, do only current inflation and unemployment matter? Be-
cause of the well-known tendency of output to respond in the short run
and inflation only later, it is obviously necessary to adopt an intertempo-
ral welfare function which takes account of the delayed effects of policy.
Second, why should the balance of payments enter at all? And what
measure of the balance of payments? I argue that the level of foreign
reserves should enter to account for the increasing cost of borrowing as
the net borrowed position rises. However, if foreign ownership of domes-
tic assets is a significant "noneconomic" issue, the current account may
enter as a separate external target affecting welfare, as I seem to have
found in the case of Japan and France.
The instantaneous or one-period welfare function that enters into the
multiperiod criterion is thus assumed to depend negatively on the rate of
change of the consumer price index (p), the deviation of the unemploy-
ment rate from a long-run target (u — «), and the deviation of end-of-
period international reserves from a long-run target level (/-/).
(1) Wt=Wt(pt,ut-uJt-f).
These objectives, while not exhaustive, encompass the major policy
targets. Real income and consumption, the truly ultimate targets, may be
thought of as being affected by all three of the arguments of (1), as well as
by the capital stock.
The constraints facing the authorities can be described as follows:194 Stanley W. Black
Consumer prices depend on the price levels of domestic and imported
goods, allowing for the exchange rate. The demand for domestic output
depends through an IS curve on the savings rate and the propensity to
import, exports, government spending, tax policy, and the expected real
rate of interest. The supply of domestic output is related to potential
output and the unemployment gap (u — u) via Okun's law. An expecta-
tions-augmented Phillips curve relates the rate of change of wages to the
unemployment gap, expected inflation, current inflation, and past infla-
tion, through indexation and "catch-up" bargaining. Domestic prices
depend on wages adjusted for productivity (unit labor costs) plus changes
in the cost of imported inputs.
2
The monetary side of the policymakers model has both stock and flow
dimensions. At the beginning of any time period, given stocks of high-
powered money and domestic and foreign bonds are available to domes-
tic and foreign residents. The quantities of these stocks may, however, be
altered within the period by monetary, fiscal, and exchange market
intervention decisions the authorities make. Individuals' portfolio de-
mands to hold different types of assets are assumed to depend on wealth,
income, exports and imports (through trade financing), domestic and
foreign interest rates, and the current and expected future price of
foreign exchange. Interest rates and exchange rates will move to equili-
brate these markets, taking into account central bank actions which
influence the monetary base and the supply of net foreign assets.
Over time, flows in the government budget and in the current account
of the balance of payments will change the supplies of domestic and net
foreign assets available to domestic and foreign wealthholders.
3 The
current account itself is assumed to depend on domestic and foreign
income levels, net interest earnings on foreign assets, and a distributed
lag on the ratio of domestic to foreign prices, corrected for the exchange
rate (p/ep*).
Maximization of the intertemporal welfare function subject to the
constraints of the model described above, including uncertainty about its
structure and coefficients, can be expected to yield policy reaction func-
2. A reduced form of such a supply side can be shown to relate the output gap to actual
and expected rates of inflation and changes in the terms of trade. Given (i) q,-q = t
(u,-u); (ii) w, = ty (M,-M) + <J> (aE pt+, + P/5, + ypr-,), a + |3 + 7=J; (iii) p,=
\xp{ + (1 - \x)pi; (iv)pf = w, - TT + \p[, we find (v) q,-q= ev|/ '
{ir + [1 - <|>(1 - M-)]pf- (X + Mpf - 4>[a(E P,+ i - Pi) ~ y(P, - P.- i)]}-
3. See Black (1977, appendix) or Branson (1979) for details. Consider the following
simplified version, where foreigners do not hold domestic bonds. Let h = d + ef be the
high-powered monetary base, with domestic and foreign components. Let a = b + ek be
private bondholdings, with domestic and foreign components. Then we assume (i) hip =
h{r, y); (ii) bla = b(r, r*, Ee, py/a); (iii) ekla = k(r, r*, Ee, pyla) for stock equilibrium.
Given the current account in terms of foreign currency, (iv) c = c(y, y*, (p/ep*)_,-, r, r*
k_i), the balance of payments implies A/+ Ak = c. The government budget deficit is
financed through issuance of domestic bonds and high-powered money, equal to Ab + Ad.195 Monetary Policy for Internal and External Balance
tions for monetary and fiscal policy as well as exchange rate intervention
policy. In general, these policy reaction functions will depend on cur-
rently observed values of the endogenous variables of the model, and
possibly some of the exogenous variables, which may provide informa-
tion on the state of the economy and hence on future movements of the
variables entering the welfare function.
In particular, I assume that the monetary policy reaction functions will
depend on currently observed inflation (p), unemployment (u), and
output gap; the ratio of reserves to imports (//m); the ratio of exports to
imports as a proxy for the current account (x/m); the ratio of domestic to
foreign prices corrected for exchange rates (p/ep*); and the foreign
interest rate (r*). There is, of course, a whole set of monetary policy
instruments to be considered, including the discount rate, reserve ratios,
credit controls, discount quotas, and open market operations to change
the monetary base. Increases in the first three of these instruments and
decreases in the latter two would be contradictionary.
The reaction function for the discount rate is expected to have the
following signs, with similar signs for reserve requirements and credit
controls, opposite for the other instruments.
m + - - - - ± +
^ ' rd = F(p, u, gap, f/m, x/m, p/ep*, r*)
Obviously, higher inflation, lower unemployment, and a lower output
gap would all be expected to lead to tighter money, ceteris paribus, as
would a low level of international reserves. A current account deficit, or
low value of exports relative to imports, would lead to tighter money if
the authorities want to encourage foreign borrowing to finance the deficit
or if they simply adopt an expenditure-reducing policy for external
reasons. A high value of domestic relative to foreign prices (p/ep*) will
lead to tighter money if the authorities try to reduce inflation to improve
competitiveness. On the other hand, if they decide to let the exchange
rate depreciate, it would lead to easier money. Finally, a higher interest
rate abroad would lead to tighter money to avoid capital outflow and
either exchange rate depreciation or loss of reserves.
In the case of reserve ratios, discount quotas, and open market opera-
tions, however, the signs on the external variables f/m and x/m may be
reversed if sterilization of reserve flows or capital flows is an important
objective. Such behavior would indicate predominance of the internal
over the external policy targets.
Uncertainty about the parameters of the economic structure is enough
to assure that no surplus of redundant policy instruments is waiting about
to be assigned in different packages to achieve given targets (Chow 1975,
chap. 10). Nevertheless, the Mundellian literature on assignment sug-
gests two main issues. First, different combinations of instruments will be
utilized according to which particular target variable is farthest from its196 Stanley W. Black
optimum value. This aspect of the assignment problem is already cap-
tured in separate reaction functions for different instruments which de-
pend on a group of target variables, presumably with different coeffi-
cients.
Second, it is possible that the assignment "rule" will change with
changing perceptions about either the economic structure or the weights
of different targets in the welfare function. This problem is most obvious
in the switch from pegged to floating exchange rates, but it is in fact more
general. The correct response is to allow for shifts in the reaction func-
tions by means of split samples or dummy variables.
6.3 Econometric Issues
There are several econometric issues to be considered in the estimation
of equations such as (2), particularly relating to data frequency, observa-
tion lags, thresholds for decisions, expectations, and simultaneity. While
quarterly data may be good enough for some purposes, I believe there are
several good grounds for preferring monthly data. Since the reaction
functions are expected to shift fairly often, degrees of freedom are in
short supply and should be maximized by use of monthly data. Second,
the timing of policy changes is more accurately dated and related to
changes in economic conditions in the monthly data. Third, the basic
decision process in central banks is related to the release of important
economic data, many of which appear on a monthly basis. Obviously,
intramonthly changes in policy are made, and in many cases no changes
are made for several months in a row, so the month is simply a compro-
mise based on considerations of data and the decision process. Other
choices are possible.
The standard, discrete-time optimal control literature (Chow 1975)
bases current period decisions on previous period values of the depen-
dent variables. For most of the data in question, simple reporting lags
suggest that this is appropriate. Lengthier distributed lags can be tested as
an empirical issue. On the other hand, certain variables, such as foreign
interest rates and reserve holdings, are observed by central banks con-
temporaneously, simply from the markets and their own balance sheets.
This suggests that the continuous time model (Chow 1981, chap. 17) in
which the policy reaction depends on the current observed value is more
appropriate for such variables. However, end-of-period reserve holdings
do not appear to be the appropriate variable to which current period
policy responds, so in this case I use beginning-of-period reserve hold-
ings.
Furthermore, several of the monetary policy instruments are adjusted
only discretely at intervals of differing length, in particular the discount197 Monetary Policy for Internal and External Balance
rate, reserve ratios, credit controls, and discount quotas. For the nine
countries with monthly data available, the discount rate was changed in
only 19 percent of the months observed. The reasons for such infrequent
adjustments presumably lie in political and administrative costs of mak-
ing more frequent changes.
Under these circumstances, ordinary least-squares regressions will
show highly autocorrelated residuals, as the predicted value will tend to
lie above or below the actual value of the dependent variable by increas-
ing amounts prior to a change. Adoption of a Koyck lag or a Cochrane-
Orcutt correction for autocorrelation will erroneously place most or all of
the explanatory power on the lagged dependent variable or the lagged
residual (Theil 1971).
The appropriate statistical model for this situation appears to be
threshold regression, in which the dependent variable adjusts to equal the
value of the regression function only if the implied change exceeds an
estimated threshold value. A nonlinear maximum likelihood approach to
this problem has been described by Dagenais (1969, 1975). Appendix A
shows that if one is willing to assume that the dependent and independent
variables entering the regression equation come from a covariance sta-
tionary stochastic process with normally distributed innovations, then it is
possible to calculate consistent estimates of the regression coefficients by
means of a simple correction to the ordinary least-squares estimates.
The intuition behind the correction can be explained if one considers
the desired change in the dependent variable, from (2) say
z* = rd* - rd- \, as a normally distributed random variable with mean |x
and variance a
2. Then the observed change z will be equal to zero unless
z* ^ k or z* ^ —k, where k is the threshold, in which cases it is equal to
z*. If we standardize to (z* - |x)/cr, there is a central region of the
standard normal distribution whose area corresponds to the percentage
of "no change" cases, an upper tail whose area corresponds to the
percentage Px of "increases," and a lower tail corresponding to the
percentage P2 of "decreases." (See Figure 6.A.I in Appendix A.) The
abscissas of the boundaries of these areas are easily shown to be
— (k + (JL)/CT and (k - |x)/cr, which can be estimated from the sample
proportions Px and P2.
It can be shown that the variance of the observed changes, z, is a
downward-based estimate of the variance of the desired changes, with a
bias factor approximately equal to B - Px + P2 + (k/a) (/x +/2), where/! and f2 are the ordinates of the standard normal distribution correspond-
ing to the abscissas of the boundary points noted above. Similarly, it can
be shown that the ordinary least-squares regression coefficients are
biased downward by a factor exactly equal to B. This correction factor is
applied to the coefficients of the stochastic explanatory variables entering198 Stanley W. Black
(2) in the threshold regressions reported below, and also to the non-
stochastic dummy variables representing changes in the political or eco-
nomic environment or shifts in the use of instruments.
In a few cases where credit controls have been utilized and there is no
effective measure of the relative strength of the controls, their use can
only be indicated by a simple zero-one dummy variable. In such cases a
logit regression model has been adopted, in which it is assumed that the
logarithm of the odds, pl{\ — p), in favor of the use of controls is a linear
function depending on the same variables as in (2) (Theil 1971, pp. 632ff.;
Cox 1970).
Several issues with respect to expectations of future values of targets
and instruments have been discussed in the literature. When the eco-
nomic structure includes expectations of future values of economic vari-
ables, the rational expectations hypothesis implies that the current
equilibrium depends on the expected future path of economic policy
variables (Chow 1981, chap. 15). How does this issue affect the reaction
functions if the rational expectations hypothesis is relevant?
Kydland and Prescott (1977) show that the optimal open-loop control
policy is inconsistent (i.e., different from the policy derived by backward
optimization and expressed as a closed-loop reaction function). The
traditional example is the final exam. The optimal examination policy is
to announce a final exam at the beginning of a course and hold it on
schedule. Backward optimization on the day of the final exam leads to
cancellation of the final, as the students have already learned the ma-
terial. Fischer (1980) shows that this problem arises from the use of
noncooperative equilibria in a multiple-player game setting. The basic
conclusion is that policy behavior based on feedback rules may be
suboptimal. However, this does not appear to invalidate the use of a
policy reaction function as a description of normal policy behavior, as
long as the authorities are allowed to change their behavior every once in
a while to deal with extraordinary situations (central banks in the crisis
zone).
The second issue is whether the expectations of future values of the
target variables should appear in the reaction functions themselves? This
question has been discussed by Chow (1981, chap. 15.3), who agrees that
these expectations might indeed appear in the reaction functions, but
then argues that the expectations can be expressed as functions of cur-
rently observed (i.e., lagged) values of the target variables. In that case,
the lagged values already incorporate all currently available information
about the expected future values of the target variables.
The final econometric problem to be considered is the possibility of
simultaneity between the instruments of monetary policy and the targets
at which they are directed. While the reaction functions relate the instru-
ments to the targets, for example, rd - f(u), the equations of the eco-199 Monetary Policy for Internal and External Balance
nomic structure show that the targets are related to the instruments, as
u = g{rd). However, the use of lagged values of the target variables has
the effect of removing such simultaneity, unless there is a serious problem
of autocorrelated residuals. Furthermore, the structural models all
confirm that there are long lags in the effects of monetary policy instru-
ments on the main targets, such as inflation, unemployment, and the
current account of the balance of payments. Use of the beginning-of-
period level of reserves helps to avoid simultaneity there as well.
The one area in which simultaneity is unavoidable is in estimation of
the sterilization coefficient, by which the monetary impact of current
changes in international reserves is offset by open market operations. In
this case, a two-stage least-squares approach seems appropriate.
6.4 Results
The results of estimating monetary policy reaction functions for the ten
countries are presented in table 6.A.I (appendix C). Exact definitions of
the variables referred to above and their sources are given in appendix D.
The overall results may be described as reasonably successful. Of 177
coefficients, excluding the time trend and dummy variables, 93 appear to
be significant with the expected sign, while only 16 appear to have
significantly wrong signs. Significance levels are frequently quite high.
There are a few troublesome results, which will be discussed below,
particularly for the U.S. unborrowed reserves equation. The basic gen-
eral conclusion, however, is that all of the measured instruments of
monetary policy do respond significantly in predictable ways to custom-
ary measures of internal and external imbalance.
Of course the main interest in a study like this is in cross-country
comparisons. Such comparisons are most readily made in the context of
the discount rate equations, which are reasonably homogenous across
countries. Therefore, table 6.1 presents consistent coefficient estimates
for the main internal and external variables in the discount rate equation.
Thus the ordinary least-squares coefficients from table 6.A.I (appendix
C) have been corrected by division for the bias factor B (discussed in
section 6.3 and shown in table 6.A.I in parenthesis together with the
sample proportion P = Px + P2). In addition, the coefficient estimates for
Italy have been adjusted to account for the fact that the discount rate was
not used as an instrument of monetary policy until July 1969, or for 35
percent of the typical sample period 1964-79. There is also an inevitable
ambiguity about the relative size of the unemployment coefficients for
France, Japan, and the Netherlands, since the ratio of unemployed
persons to vacancies was used in those equations rather than the unem-
ployment rate. While there is always some lack of comparability across
countries for the other variables, their definitions are close enough toI
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allow one to argue that changes in such variables represent the same
phenomena in each country.
From table 6.1, relatively high weights are given to the inflation target
by Belgium, Germany, Italy, France, and the United States, while rel-
atively lower weights are given to inflation by Britain, Canada, the
Netherlands, Japan, and Sweden.
4 These, of course, are average re-
sponses over the sample period 1963-79. In figure 6.1, we observe that
the weight given to the inflation rate is inversely correlated with the
observed average inflation rate over the inflationary period 1971-79, with
the exceptions of Italy, the Netherlands, and Canada.
This evidence appears to support the proposition that countries which
give a relatively high policy weight to inflation succeed in having lower
inflation rates, at least in most cases. A cross-section regression equation
of average inflation (p) on the inflation coefficient ($p), net oil imports in
1973 as a percent of total primary energy consumption (OIL), and
external orientation to a large stable trading partner (EXT) yields
p = 9.83 - 4.27(3/? + 6.44 OIL - 0.51 EXT, R
2 = .57,
(4.0) (2.2) (2.5) (1.0)
where EXT is equal to the external rank from table 6.1 x largest MERM
weight x standard deviation of inflation rate of largest MERM-weight
partner. This equation is plotted as a line in figure 6.1. During the 1970s,
Canada and the Netherlands succeeded in having relatively low inflation
despite having low policy weights for domestic inflation, while Italy did
not succeed despite having a high weight. In the cases of Canada and the
Netherlands, energy self-sufficiency and orientation to a large, stable
trading partner contributed to this result, while Italy lacked these saving
graces.
The unemployment coefficients tend to cluster around the value 0.4,
with four countries apparently significantly above that value (Japan,
Sweden, Italy, and the United States) and one country well below (the
United Kingdom). Since Italy and the United States are counries with
high average unemployment rates and Japan, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom with low, there is little correlation between the observed unem-
ployment rates and the policy weights given to the unemployment target.
Presumably this reflects the substantial structural component in cross-
country differences in unemployment rates, or the assignment of fiscal
policy to unemployment.
Figure 6.2 shows the relationship between weights for the inflation and
unemployment targets. After taking account of oil dependence and ex-
ternal orientation, there is a clear inverse correlation between the weights
assigned to the two targets. A cross-section regression of the inflation
4. These are weights in the reaction functions (2) and are not to be misinterpreted as
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coefficient ($p) on the absolute value of the unemployment coefficient
((3w), oil dependence as defined above (OIL), and the relative ranking of
external and internal variables from table 6.1 (EXINT), equal to the
external rank minus the internal rank, yields
Pp = .52 - .97|pw| + .87 OIL - .17 EXINT, R
3 - .87.
(3.1) (3.6) (3.1) (5.5)
This equation is plotted as a line in figure 6.2, where OIL and INT are
evaluated at the means for seven countries, excluding Canada, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Japan and Sweden appear to
have placed relatively more weight on unemployment than inflation; the
United States, Italy, and perhaps France are in an intermediate position;
while Belgium and Germany appear to have placed relatively low weight
on unemployment relative to inflation. This certainly accords with at least
some of my preconceptions.





















also suggest that the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands have
placed relatively little weight on internal targets, so we might expect
these countries to have placed relatively higher weights on their external
targets. Conversely, since the other countries seem to have placed rather
higher weights on their internal targets, we might expect to find them
having relatively lower weights for external variables. Note that Italy, by
placing higher weights on both internal targets, may have changed its
policies too frequently, contributing to its policy failure.
It is inevitably somewhat harder to summarize the results for the four
external variables, as compared to the two internal variables. The United
Kingdom has consistently high weights for the external variables, as
generations of economists have learned to know. Similarly, the United
States has consistently low weights for external variables, again as the
folklore has it. Italy also has pretty consistently low weights for the
external targets, as expected from its high weighting for internal targets.
Aside from these extreme cases, we see that Germany places little204 Stanley W. Black
weight on reserves or the current account balance, but does respond to
relative price and relative interest rate differentials. One might argue that
this shows a tendency to anticipate external imbalance problems before
they show up in the balance of payments. The Netherlands shows a
similar, but weaker, pattern. By contrast, France and Japan place rel-
atively more weight on the current account, while Sweden and Canada
emphasize the level of reserves. These countries appear more likely to
wait until they get into balance of payments troubles before taking action.
The difference between current account and reserve weights might be
attributed to a greater willingness to place Swedish and Canadian bond
issues in international markets, making current account imbalance a less
significant problem. Perhaps these two small countries have become
more accustomed to foreign borrowing.
A noticeable inverse relationship exists between the importance of
internal and external targets, as mentioned earlier. Figure 6.3 plots the
average ranking of internal and external targets for each country, which
has Spearman rank correlation of —.75. Figure 6.3 suggests the conjec-
ture that countries with extreme weightings, either on external or internal
targets, may do less well than others, since the United Kingdom and Italy
appear at either extreme.
These conclusions from the discount rate equations concerning the
relative importance of different targets for different countries are, broad-
ly speaking, confirmed by examination of the other instruments of mone-
tary policy. Domestic inflation does not appear to be an important target
for the United Kingdom, Canada, or the Netherlands for any of the
instruments. Sweden and Japan's low weights for inflation are confirmed,
as well as Beglium and France's relatively high weights.
Canadian and Swedish emphasis on reserve targets holds across all
instruments, though the current account appears to some extent as well.
Belgium, like Germany and the Netherlands, appears to weight relative
foreign price competitiveness significantly as an external target for its
credit controls and discount quotas.
The political variables discussed in appendix D are frequently quite
significant and play an important role in allowing determination of the
policy reaction functions. Some earlier work which omitted them found,
in general, less significant effects for the policy targets. Particularly
noticeable influences can be seen for the U.S. external policy constraints
on Canada, and for the shifts in electoral power in France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The general conclusion
is that more conservative governments were more willing to tighten
monetary policies, which is certainly not surprising. An alternative inter-
pretation is that more "socialist" influence tended to ease monetary
policy, leading to inflation and changes in election outcomes in favor of








The effects of floating exchange rates during the 1970s have been
examined by splitting the sample at the beginning of the floating rate
period for each country and by including dummy variables for specific
episodes of floating prior to the adoption of generalized floating rates in
1973. While the specific dummy variables show only modest effects, the
split samples for the discount rate equations (not shown here) demon-
strate a pattern of greater emphasis on internal variables and less empha-
sis on external variables during the floating rate period for Belgium,
Germany, and, to some extent, for Japan and the United States. This is,
of course, what one would expect. On the other hand, the relative
importance of internal and external variables appeared to shift in favor of
external variables for the Netherlands, which, like Belgium, was pegged
to the deutsche mark in the European Economic Community Narrow
Margins Agreement, or EEC Snake. The difference between the two
countries in the floating rate period thus appears to reinforce the overall
difference in their focus described earlier. One may also observe that the206 Stanley W. Black
Netherlands emphasis on external targets was accompanied by several
revaluations within the Snake, while Belgium has devalued since the
beginning of the European Monetary System in 1979.
It is also of interest to compare the floaters versus the peggers. From
figure 6.3, we see that the two smallest and most steadfast Snake mem-
bers, Belgium and the Netherlands, have the second highest average
ranking of external variables after the United Kingdom. Sweden, Ger-
many, and France, the other Snake members, give at least moderate
attention to external variables. With the exception of the United King-
dom, the other floaters tend to have lower than average rankings for
external variables and, with the exception of Canada, higher than aver-
age rankings for internal variables. A cross-section regression of external
rank (EXTRANK), defined as ten minus the average external rank in the
last line of table 6.1, yields
EXTRANK = 5.15 - 2.21F+ 5.06 UK, R
2 = .85,
(4.2) (5.8)
where F — 1 for floaters, 0 otherwise, and UK = 1 for United Kingdom, 0
otherwise. The anomalous results for Britain may be explained by im-
pressionistic evidence that both the instruments and the objectives of
British monetary policy have fluctuated sharply over the period. From
heavy concentration on external objectives relative to a pegged exchange
rate in the 1960s, Britain apparently shifted policy emphasis to internal
objectives with a floating rate during 1972-76. Following an IMF standby
agreement in late 1976, policy seems to have shifted back in the direction
of external objectives with a quasi-pegged exchange rate during much of
1977. More work is needed to sort out these shifts.
The sign of the relative price competitiveness variable p/ep* is also tied
up with exchange rate objectives, as noted earlier. Reduced competitive-
ness as measured by an increase in the relative price of domestic goods
leads to significantly tighter monetary policy for at least one instrument in
all countries except the United States and Italy. In those two cases
reduced competitiveness seems to lead to easier policy, which suggests
that competitiveness would be restored by letting the exchange rate
depreciate. This suggestion is strengthened by the split-sample finding
that the variable has a positive sign for the United States during the
pegged rate period and a negative sign during the floating period.
Perhaps the most interesting equation in table 6.A.I (appendix C) is
the one for the changes in U.S. unborrowed reserves adjusted for
changes in reserve requirements. The overall equation is rather weak, but
both unemployment and the reserve/import ratio have the wrong signs,
suggesting that open market operations have been procyclical. Since
there is substantial controversy over the interpretation of U.S. monetary207 Monetary Policy for Internal and External Balance
policy, when comparing interest rates and monetary aggregates, this may
not be too surprising. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe this
indication of the conflict between "monetarist" and "Keynesian" inter-
pretations of policy. The comparable equations for Canada (DNDA) and
Germany (DMPD) have correct signs for unemployment.
6.6 Conclusions
In addition to the individual country patterns of monetary policy,
several general findings have emerged from this study, (a) There is an
inverse correlation between the importance given to inflation objectives
in formulating monetary policy in different countries and observed rates
of inflation in the 1970s, (b) The importance attached to inflation and
unemployment objectives varies inversely across countries, (c) There
appears to be little relationship across countries between the importance
of unemployment objectives and observed rates of unemployment, (d)
There is an inverse correlation across countries between the importance
of internal and external objectives for monetary policy, (e) There is an
inverse correlation between the flexibility of the exchange rate and the
relative importance of external compared to internal objectives. This
finding holds both over time, comparing periods of pegged rates and
floating rates, and across countries, comparing peggers with floaters, (f)
Finally, conservative election victories have often led to tighter monetary
policies, following easier monetary policies influenced by "socialist"
electoral strength.
Appendix A Threshold Regression
The Inconsistency of the Least-Squares Estimator
The threshold model
5 can be stated in terms of a latent structure
(Al) >v*=a + P'*, + e,,f=l, . . . , T, er~7V(0, a
2),
which is assumed to satisfy all of the assumptions of the multivariate
normal regression model. The observed dependent variable, however,
obeys the law
(A2) *yt = y?-y,-i if \yt*-yt-i\^k,
= 0 otherwise.
5. This approach, an extension of the work of W. H. Greene, was suggested by R. Olsen
and developed by the author (1981).208 Stanley W. Black
The underlying variables of (Al) are assumed to be jointly and nor-
mally distributed, according to
(A3)
o\
for all t. The normality assumption on the dependent variable is standard;
that on the independent variables is necessary for the derivation of
truncated covariances below.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) applied to an observed random sample









using standard notation for the sample moments. To derive the asymp-
totic bias of the OLS estimators, I follow the approach developed by
Greene (1981) for the Tobit case, mutatis mutandis. From (A2) we have
(A5)
+ yt-iP(\y*-yt-i\<k).
Transforming to zt = yt — yt-i, z* = y* — yt-\, defining |JL* = |JL - ^r_1; and dropping subscripts, we can rewrite (A5) as
(A6) E(z) — E(z*\\z* ^k)P(\z* ^k)
where $ and cj> are the standard normal cumulative distribution and





The derivation of (A6) utilizes the movements of the truncated normal distribution:
E(z*\z*^L) = (x, + CX*TT, and V(z*\z*^L) = a?(l + (TT - -a
2), where € = (L - |x.)/cr.,
and 7T = <))(€)/[ 1 - $(€)] (see Johnson and Kotz 1970, pp. 81-82.209 Monetary Policy for Internal and External Balance
Fig. 6.A.I











^ -k) ^ -A:)
2] - [E(z)f
introducing the symbols B, ru r2 for convenience.
7
(A8) C(x, z) = E(x, z) - E(x)E(z)
E(z* z*^ -
7. Note that Sis equal to the unshaded area of figure 6. A. I;r2 = Ezla,,rx = r2- u./cr*210 Stanley W. Black
The conditional covariance terms in (A8) are evaluated, following
Greene (1981), by using the assumption of joint normality of x and z* to
apply the following theorem (see Johnson and Kotz 1972, p. 70). For
random variables ux and u2 with £(wi) = 0, E(u2) = 0, V(a1) = Sn,
V(u2) = X22, C{ii\, u2) = S12, such that E{u2 ux) is linear in ux and V(u2 «i) is constant, under any type of selection on ux,







selection on H, =
- 1 v
ll ^1
where T^ = E(ui\selection on wT), and ftn = VCa^selection on ux). In
our case ux = 2* - |JU, a2 = x - MX, and selection is either according to
so that T^ = £(z*||z*| ^k) - |x*. Applying the ^fc or z*^-k,







Substituting into (A8) and collecting terms, we find
(AH) C{x, z) = ux
To find the inconsistency of the OLS estimators (A4), we need the
population parameters, which by normality (A3) are211 Monetary Policy for Internal and External Balance
(A12)
Therefore,







As A: goes to zero, figure 6.A.I indicates that the bias factor in (A14)
vanishes and we revert to a classical regression problem. More gener-
ally, however, the OLS estimator b is proportionally biased downward
toward 0.
Consistent Estimation of the Parameters
Having derived expressions for the inconsistency of the OLS estima-
tors for each of the model's parameters, we need only to estimate the
biases from the sample data to provide consistent estimators of the
parameters. Applying Greene's (1981) suggestion for the Tobit case to
the present model, the sample proportions of observed increases, Pl, and
decreases, P2, in the dependent variable are unbiased, consistent estima-
tors of 4>, and $2- Referring to figure 6.A.1, if it happened that Pl = P2,
we have \x* = 0, and — (£/cr*) = <£>~
 l(P2) would be a consistent estimator
of the threshold in units of cr*. In general, {k — |i*)/cr* = <I>~
 l(l — Px), and
- [(k + |i*)/o-*] - ®~\P2), so that
(A15) 1
(A16) ^=±[<S>-\l-Pi)
Then cj^ and fa
 ca
n be consistently estimated by
' k — (1* r
and
k + il212 Stanley W. Black
These results enable estimation of the bias factor B and r1 and r2 defined
implicitly in (A7).
Autoregressive Explanatory Variables
In time series applications of the threshold model, the explanatory
variables x, are unlikely to be independently distributed over time, as
required by the theorem used above to develop the covariance results.
For example, suppose that the x's of (Al) follow the autoregressive
process
(A17) x, = Ar,_, +wt,w[~Nh_l(iLw,Xww),
which could serve to model typical time series processes. Then the x,
process is a moving average of normal variables and is likewise normal,
with an autocovariance function that can be expressed in terms of the
parameters of (A17).
More generally, if we can assume that the h + 1 dimensional stochastic
process {yf\ x't) is covariance stationary, then the Wold theorem (Malin-
vaud, p. 435; or Sargent 1976, p. 257) implies that a moving average
representation exists of the form
yr
X, cxx(L) d2l
where ctj{L) is a polynomial in the lag operation L; v, and w, are seri-
ally uncorrelated random variables, such that E(vt) = 0, E(wr) — 0,
V(v,) = 07,, V(M>,) = S,VM.; and du,d2l are deterministic processes of time.
We may as well assume also that (vf, wf') are jointly and normally dis-
tributed. Under such conditions, the innovations or prediction errors,










satisfy the requirements of the theorem used above. Specializing to the
autoregressive process (A17), it is easy to show that (Al) is equivalent to
(A19) j>,*=p% + e,,
where y*- y*- a - P'Ar,_,, x, - x, -Ax,_x - w,. Thus the OLS re-
gression may be decomposed into an autoregressive part,
(A20) y, = a + b'Ax,^x,
and an innovation part with the autoregressive part removed,
(A21) yt = b'x, + er.
Note that the regression coefficients are the same in both (A20) and
(A21) and correspond to the usual OLS estimates, while other statistics213 Monetary Policy for Internal and External Balance
such as R
2, s
2, etc., will differ between innovation regression and the
OLS regression.
Appendix B Institutions
Belgium has occasionally used credit controls (CC) and special reserve
requirements (RR) on the banks in addition to its regular instruments,
which are the discount rate (RD) and variable discount quotas (DQ) for
individual banks' borrowing from the central bank. Threshold models are
used for the latter two instruments and a logit approach for the first two.
Canada uses a variable secondary reserve ratio (RQ), in addition to the
discount rate and open market operations (OMO), which affect the net
domestic assets (NDA) of the central bank, as a component of the
monetary base. The Canadian economic environment has also been
significantly affected by the Quebec Separatist election victory in 1978, by
a ceiling on its allowed holdings of international reserves agreed with the
United States during 1965-68, and by the effects of U.S. efforts to
control capital outflows during 1968-74.
France has at various times utilized both reserve requirements on bank
liabilities and credit controls to limit the growth of credit. The credit
controls, known as the encadrement du credit, impose progressively
higher reserve requirements on individual banks that exceed prescribed
norms for the growth of nonexempt or controlled credit. A measure of
the stringency of the controls, called the morsure or "bite," has been
constructed by the Banque de France, making use of business opinion
surveys on the difficulty of obtaining credit and objective evidence on the
growth of credit relative to the ceilings, (exempt) lending to residents in
foreign currency, and various measures for the slowing of payments. A
threshold approach is used for the "bite" and for the discount rate, while
a logit model is used for the adoption of credit controls or reserve
requirements. Several political factors have had important effects on the
economic environment, including the strikes of May 1968, President
Giscard d'Estaing's promise to restore the franc to the Snake after his
election as president in 1974, and the center-right victory in the Par-
liamentary elections of 1978.
Germany utilizes open market operations, changes in discount quotas
and reserve requirements, as well as changes in reserves on foreign
liabilities of commercial banks and nonbanks (the "Bardepot"). The first
three of these are combined with changes in currency (CURR) and
government cash (GCSH) balances into a domestic monetary policy
measure reflecting policy-induced changes in the monetary base, or cen-
tral bank money (CBM), as OMO + ADQ - ARR - CURR - GCSH.214 Stanley W. Black
The last two items are combined into a foreign monetary policy measure.
In addition, foreign currency swaps at favorable rates were often used to
induce commercial banks to switch liquid asset holdings abroad.
Italy differs from other countries in having failed to use the discount
rate until 1969, when the policy of pegging interest rates was abandoned.
Since 1973 a more or less continuous policy of ceilings on bank lending
has been utilized, but equally continuous pressure to provide credit to the
public sector has kept the ceilings from being very useful. Required
reserves, both on domestic liabilities (RR) and on foreign liabilities (RF),
particularly in the form of prior deposits for imports in 1974 and 1976,
have been more effective measures of policy. Much rhetoric concerning
the monetary base and the control of "total domestic credit" has
apparently been of little effect.
Several other shifts in the use of monetary policy instruments affected
those referred to above, in particular the frequent use of controls over
banks' net foreign asset positions (BFP), a major reduction in the re-
quired reserve ratios in 1965 (DRR), and the constraints imposed by the
1977 standby credit agreement with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).
A number of political factors have been examined for their effects on
monetary policy, including the beginning of political instability marked
by the end of the Socialist-Christian Democratic coalition, the fall of the
Moro government in 1968, and the period of Communist influence over
the Christian Democratic government between the Communist election
victory of 1976 and their defeat of 1978.
Japan has placed heavy emphasis on credit controls through a process
known as "window guidance," which is measured by the quarterly per-
centage increase or decrease specified by the Bank of Japan in the annual
rate of change in individual banks' loan portfolios (WG). In addition,
reserve requirements have been varied and, to a minor extent, open
market operations have been utilized, especially since 1966. During late
1969, the so-called yen-shift operations to promote repayment of foreign
borrowings were encouraged.
The Netherlands has utilized a variable secondary reserve ratio (RQ)
since 1973, in addition to open market operations. Prior to and during
1973, a system of required primary reserves was used on occasion. In
addition, credit controls have also been imposed at times. Other factors
influencing monetary policy have included occasional periods in which
the Dutch guilder floated prior to 1973 and two extended periods in
1972-73 and 1977 during which the Netherlands functioned without an
elected government.
Sweden has utilized a secondary reserve ratio (RQ) as well as credit
controls over bank lending (CC) and primary reserve requirements (RR)
in its conduct of monetary policy. In addition, firms are permitted to215 Monetary Policy for Internal and External Balance
make investment deposits (INV) in the central bank, tax free, out of
profits which are retained for future investment purposes. These deposits
are then released by the central bank to the firms in accordance with
monetary policy objectives. The main political shift affecting the Swedish
economic environment has been the replacement of the Social Demo-
cratic government that had been in power for forty years with its
"bourgeois" opposition in 1976. In August 1977, the Swedish krona
floated out of the EEC Snake.
The United Kingdom made a major change in its quantitative monetary
policy instruments with the adoption of the Competition and Credit
Control Act in 1971 (CCC), which sought to abolish a system of informal
credit controls on the banks in favor of renewed use of a reserve ratio
system, including however a substantial reduction in the reserve ratio at
the same time. The resulting credit expansion, in conjunction with an
endogenous reserve base and an initial willingness to see a substantial
growth of bank credit, led to a reimposition of credit controls via sup-
plementary special deposits (the "corset") in December 1973. The
"corset," unlike the French "encadrement," imposes increasing reserve
requirements on banks whose liabilities rise above specified ceilings.
Another factor seriously affecting the conduct of British monetary policy
was the need to support via domestic monetary policy the major devalua-
tion of the pound sterling in 1967. Finally, there have been increasingly
sharp shifts in the course of both monetary and fiscal policy associated
with the changes in government between the Labor and Conservative
parties in 1970, 1974, and 1978.
The United States has traditionally utilized open market operations as
its chief monetary policy tool, aiming to influence short-term interest
rates and the rate of expansion of bank credit and the money supply by
changing unborrowed reserves (NB) available to the domestic banking
system. As reserve requirements have also been changed at various
times, the measure of unborrowed reserves is adjusted to allow for the
implied changes in the demand for high-powered money. In November
1978 a major shift in the orientation of domestic monetary policy more
toward external objectives was combined with a large increase in the
scale of exchange market intervention. Again in October 1979 a further
change in monetary policy shifted the main short-run target to allow
much greater flexibility in interest rates. In addition, monetary policy has
operated in somewhat different environments during the period of wage
and price controls, known as the New Economic Policy (NEP), during
1971-72, and during the 1968-73 period of capital controls over the
balance of payments, and during the collapse of the Franklin National
Bank in 1974.216 Stanley W. Black
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NOTE: |/| ratios in parentheses; P is percent of observations with change or percent of
correct forecasts in logit; B is bias factor; d (or h) is Durbin-Watson (or Durbin) statistic; *
indicates incorrect sign.
aFL = 1 in floating period.
hdnfa.
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Appendix D Data Sources
Sources
IFS: International Financial Statistics (IMF, Washington)—€. indi-
cates line number
MEI: Main Economic Indicators (OECD, Paris)












SA indicates seasonal dummies used.
Dependent Variables
BITE Index of "bite" of credit controls. FR—BCB, Sept. 1978.
CC Dummy variable for use of credit controls. NL—BCB;
SW—The Swedish Economy.
DNB Change in unborrowed reserves, adjusted for changes in
reserve requirements. US—BCB.
DMPD GR: (OMO + ADQ - ARR - ACURR - GCSH)/CBM
( — 1): open market operations plus increase in dis-
count quota less increase in required reserves, cur-
rency, and government cash deposits, all as percent
of monetary base in preceding period. OMO, ADQ,
ARR—BCB; ACURR—IFS€.14a; GCSH—IFS
€.87; CBM—MEI.
DMPF GR: (ARF + BARDP)/CBM(-1): BCB for change in re-
serves on foreign liabilities (ARF) of commercial
banks and "Bardepot" reserves (BARDP) on non-
bank foreign liabilities.
DQ Discount quota, in domestic currency, period average.
BG—BCB.
INV Investment fund deposits in central bank, domestic cur-
rency, end of period. SW—IFS €.15.
DNDA Change in net domestic assets of central bank, domestic
currency, end of period, as percent of monetary base in
preceding period. CN—IFS €.12a.
RRCC Dummy variable for use of reserve requirement or credit
controls. BG, FR—BCB.
RD Central bank discount rate, percent, end of month. IFS
€.60.
RFDC Reserves on foreign liabilities of commercial banks, as223 Monetary Policy for Internal and External Balance
percent of domestic credit. IT—IFS €.16c/€.32d for end-
of-period data.
RQ Reserve ratio, in percent, period average. CN—BCB for
secondary reserve ratio; NL—BCB; SW—The Swedish
Economy.
RRDC Required reserves, as percent of domestic credit, end of
month. BG—IFS €.14-€.14a/€.32; IT—IFS €.12e/€.32d;
JP, NL, SW—IFS €.12e/€.32; UK—IFS €.20x/€.32.
WG Window guidance, quarterly percent increase or decrease
in annual rate of change of bank loans allowed by Bank of
Japan. Japan Economic Yearbook.
Independent Variables (lagged one period, where indicated)
p_\ Rate of change of consumer price index. IFS €.64.
«_! Unemployment rate (except for FR, JP, NL—number of
unemployed/number of vacancies). MEL
gap_t Manufacturing output, deviation from exponential trend
with break in January 1974. IFS. €.66c.
(/7ra)_! Foreign exchange reserves/imports. IFS. €.ld.d./€.71d.
(x/m)_1 Exports/imports. IFS €.70d/€.71d.
dnfa Change in net foreign assets of central bank. IFS €.11,
except IT—IFS €.ld.d.
(p/ep*)_i Relative normalized unit labor costs, corrected for ex-
change rates. IFS €.65umc.
r* Three-month Eurodollar rate of interest, in percent, end
of period. IFS €.60d(UK).
t Time trend.
dfloat Change in Federal Reserve float. IFS €.13a(US).
Dummy Variables
BG RR—use of required reserves; CC—use of credit controls.
CN QUE—since Quebec Separatist election victory;
USRES—during agreement with US on reserve ceiling;
USBOP—controls on US capital account.
FR GISC—after Giscard's election before reentry into Snake;
MAY 68—strikes; ELECT—since center-right election
victory.
GR SWAP—availability of dollar swaps with central bank;
NIX—from August to December 1971; DMFL—tempo-
rary floating exchange rate; OPEC—increased at January
1974 and January 1979.
IT COM—period of Communist strength in elections; BFP—
use of controls over bank's foreign asset positions; DRR—
change in required reserve ratios; IMF—period of IMF
standby agreement; MOROF—fall of Moro government,
beginning of greater political instability; DTC—rate of
growth of domestic credit since 1974.224 Stanley W. Black
JP YENSH—period of policy to aid "yen shift", repayment
of foreign borrowings; OMO1—commencement of open
market operations at market prices.
NL NOGOV—periods of interregnum; RR—use of required
reserve system; GLFL—floating exchange rate.
SW BOURG—"bourgeois" parties in power; SKRFL—float-
ing exchange rate; INV75, INV79—large-scale use of in-
vestment and liquidity deposits.
UK NIX—from August to December 1971; OPEC—increases
in January 1974 and January 1979; HEATH—Heath gov-
ernment; THATCH—Thatcher government; DEVAL—
devaluation of pound in 1967; CCC—Competition and
Credit Control introduction of new monetary control
system.
US OPEC—increases in January 1974 and January 1979;
NEP—price and wage controls; INTVN—new policy of
exchange market intervention; TARGT—adoption of
monetary target with more flexible interest rates; CAPC—
capital account controls; FRANK—loans to Franklin
National Bank.
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Comment Leonardo Leiderman
With the advent of increased macroeconomic volatility in the 1970s, there
has been growing interest in comparing across countries the different
macro performances that have been observed. Countries differ in their
macro performances because of differences in: (i) economic structures,
(ii) economic shocks, and (iii) policies adopted by the authorities. A
highly debated issue in this context is the relative importance of each one
of these three factors in "explaining" observed differences across coun-
tries.
Black's paper presents an international comparison of the utilization of
monetary policy instruments among ten leading developed countries.
This comparison is made on the basis of estimated monetary policy
reaction functions and it clearly constitutes a prerequisite for attempting
to assess the potential empirical importance of factor (iii) above. Main
distinguishing features of this investigation are: (i) the use of a relatively
large amount of information (monthly data for sixteen years and ten
countries); (ii) the use of a threshold regression technique; and (iii) the
attempt to take into account political and institutional factors that poten-
tially affect the conduct of monetary policy. Also, the paper's appendix B
contains valuable information on the implementation of monetary policy
in different countries.
In my opinion, the paper is generally useful and informative. However,
I have some doubts about the meaning of the present results. These
doubts arise because of the existence of potentially serious limitations in
the paper's methodology and empirical analysis. I turn now to a discus-
sion of these limitations.
Methodology
Black proposes treating the estimated reaction functions as being
derived from maximization of an intertemporal welfare function of the
authorities subject to a perceived econometric model of the rest of the
economy (see Chow 1975). Obviously, to get estimable reaction function
equations it is required to assume specific forms for both the authorities'
welfare function and the economy's structure. Yet in the paper, none of
these specifications are made in a degree of detail that would enable one
to actually derive the estimated reaction functions—like equation (2)—
from this framework of optimization. In other words, the present analysis
proceeds by directly postulating the reaction function equations to be
estimated, and this gives rise to several problematic issues.
First, the authorities are assumed to react to changes in inflation,
unemployment, etc., only with one-month lag (provided that these
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changes exceed the pertinent thresholds). It seems to me difficult both to
justify this specification as a plausible one and to relate it to the intertem-
poral optimization idea. The latter would imply that current monetary
policy reacts not only to past changes in inflation, unemployment, etc.,
but also to those changes that are expected to occur in the present and
future periods. It may well be that these expected changes are in turn
systematically related to past changes in these variables. However, the
one-month lag specification would seem to hold only under very restric-
tive assumptions.' Moreover, under the present specifications the author-
ities are implicitly assumed to respond to permanent and transitory
shocks in inflation, unemployment, etc., in exactly the same manner—an
implication that seems to be at variance with those of the intertemporal
optimization framework.
Second, the present analysis treats the reaction functions postulated
for the policy instruments of each country as separate equations. Instead,
an explicit optimization framework—and even policymaking in prac-
tice—is likely to result in restrictions across these equations. Testing
these restrictions can provide some information on the internal consist-
ency and empirical accuracy of the optimization framework for analyzing
central bank behavior in practice.
Third, other (more general) questions can be raised regarding the
present specifications: (i) Why is it that foreign exchange intervention
reaction functions are not considered here? Doesn't this intervention
have potential monetary implications that need to be taken into account?
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(ii) Wouldn't it be more plausible to assume that, in equation (1), the
variable / represents the country's net external indebtedness than to
assume that it stands for the stock of international reserves? (iii) Aren't
there interactions between monetary and fiscal policies that are not taken
into account here? For example, doesn't a government budget deficit
have implications for monetary policy that need to be incorporated into
the analysis?
Fourth, it is not at all clear how one should interpret the estimated
coefficients. Theory suggests that they represent the combined influence
of the effect of an instrument on a target variable and the weight of the
target in the welfare function. In other words, these coefficients are
generally functions of structural parameters and of parameters that cap-
ture policy preferences. Attempting to disentangle these "fundamental"
parameters from the estimated coefficients may not always be possible
(see, e.g., Makin 1976), and it is certainly impossible in the current setup.
1. Black claims that "the structural models all confirm that there are long lags in the
effects of monetary policy instruments on the main targets, such as inflation, unemploy-
ment, and the current account of the balance of payments" (section 6.3, conclusion). Given
this, how can one rationalize the paper's one-month lag specifications?
2. See Black (1980) for an econometric study of central bank intervention reaction
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Given this, one cannot determine whether the cross-country differences
in the estimated reaction functions are mainly the result of differences in
economic structures or in preferences of monetary policymakers. Yet for
most potential uses of the estimated coefficients—like analyzing the
importance given to a specific target in formulating monetary policy—it
seems very important to attempt to disentangle the "fundamental" pa-
rameters from the econometric estimates.
Empirical Analysis
In interpreting the estimated monetary policy reaction functions,
Black focuses mainly on cross-country comparisons. My main comment
on the results of these comparisons is that they are not robust;
3 therefore
caution is suggested in dealing with the empirical conclusions of the
paper. In particular, these conclusions appear to be very sensitive to the
choice of the specific countries that are considered in a given comparison.
To show that this is the case, let us turn to some of Black's main
conclusions, discussed in section 6.6 of the paper. Consider the first
conclusion: "There is an inverse correlation between the importance
given to inflation objectives in formulating monetary policy in different
countries and observed rates of inflation in the 1970s." This conclusion is
based on analysis of the data plotted in figure 6.1 of the paper. To reach
such a conclusion one must exclude (at least) three countries from the
comparison: Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands. Although the author
discusses some ad hoc reasons for excluding these countries, it seems to
me that similar reasons may dictate excluding other countries from the
analysis. And if we were to exclude only Belgium, Germany, and the
United Kingdom, for example, it is quite possible that the above-
mentioned inverse correlation would change sign.
A similar phenomenon holds in the case of other conclusions, like
conclusion (b), which is partially based on figure 6.2. Here Canada, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have been excluded from the
analysis. However, if one were to include these countries in the interna-
tional comparison, the present results would be altered.
A related problematic issue is the lack of use of statistical tests for
significance in deriving the main conclusions of the paper. Questions of
statistical significance arise at several points in the analysis. For example,
how significant are the relationships depicted in figures 6.1-6.3 which
gave rise to conclusions (a), (b), and (d) of the paper? Another example
is conclusion (e), which deals with the relationship between the flexibility
of the exchange rate and the importance attached to external versus
internal objectives. This conclusion has been reached from sample splits
for the different estimated equations. Are the observed subsample differ-
3. This lack of robustness holds even if one abstracts from the above comments on
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ences significant? Dealing with these questions is of crucial importance in
an empirical study of this nature. Otherwise the reader can only speculate
on the confidence to be attached to the present results.
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Comment Alan C. Stockman
Black's paper begins with the question of why economies differ cross-
sectionally in their performance. He forms a trichotomy of reasons:
differences in external shocks affecting economies, differences in eco-
nomic structures, and differences in economic policies. Although some
economists may argue that differences in economic policies are them-
selves endogenously determined as the result of differences in shocks and
underlying structures of economies, this trichotomy could, with certain
definitions of the three categories (which Black does not provide), form
an exhaustive set of reasons for differences in economic performance.
Black then seeks to determine the extent to which differences in policies
have accounted for differences in economic performance in recent years
among a sample of OECD countries by examining the extent to which
their policies have differed and by explaining those differences in poli-
cies.
The approach Black takes to cross-sectional differences in economic
policies in his paper is, unfortunately, narrow. His empirical model treats
differences in economic policies as differences in outcomes for (or
realizations of) the central bank discount rate and other government
control variables when conditions in the economy (e.g., inflation)
change, rather than treating economic policies as rules generating these
outcomes. This shows up, for example, in his use of political dummy
variables (described in his appendix D) in the regression results. Two
countries may differ substantially in their policies because one country
may change the relationship between inflation (or unemployment, etc.)
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and changes in the discount rate with great frequency, while another
country may maintain a more stable relationship between these variables
over time. Even if the average relationships between inflation or unem-
ployment and changes in the discount rate are the same in the two
countries, we may think of these countries as having radically different
policies because of the differences in the stability of their rules. These
rules should be thought of as part of the policies pursued. If this were
done, many of the ambiguous results obtained by Black (discussed be-
low) might become easier to interpret.
Black's empirical procedure is to examine a set of variables under
direct control of the government and to view these variables as functions
of target variables (such as inflation and unemployment) and future
expected values of these target variables. These expected future values
are replaced with other variables that Black views as providing informa-
tion on the state of the economy and hence on future movements in the
target variables. The function is then estimated by a threshold regression
technique, discussed below. Aside from issues regarding the choice of
target variables, lag length, choice of control variables (such as the
central bank discount rate and required reserve ratios), and sensitivity of
the results to choices of dummy variables for political changes, there is an
issue regarding the replacement of expected future values of the target
variables by variables that are viewed by the econometrician as predictors
of future values of these variables. One procedure for accomplishing the
desired estimation would be to examine the observable variables that
Granger-cause future movements in the target variables and to use this
information to form optimal predictors, as of the current time, of these
future movements. One would therefore obtain two sets of equations:
one set relating current control variables to current and lagged values of
all the variables in the model, and a second set describing expected future
changes in the target variables as functions of current and lagged values of
all the variables in the model. The equations can then be estimated
simultaneously, imposing (and testing) the cross-equation restrictions
imposed by the model and by the assumption of rational expectations.
(Without the assumption of rational expectations, it would be impossible
to place any interpretation on the estimated coefficients of the variables
proxying for future changes in the targets.)
Black does not impose or test these restrictions that are implied by his
model. As a consequence, the reader is left with greater uncertainty
about whether the reported estimates should be viewed as reflecting
structural reaction functions or as some reduced forms that could not be
given the interpretations that Black would like to give them.
The interpretations that Black gives to the results do not appear to be
supported by the results themselves. He claims that the results show an
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functions and the average inflation rates over the period, and he inter-
prets this as evidence that countries with greater relative concern about
inflation succeed at having lower inflation rates. This is illustrated in
figure 6.1 in his paper, where Black treats Italy, the Netherlands, and
Canada as outliers in the relationship. But one may as well treat the
United Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium as outliers and conclude that
the figure illustrates a positive correlation. Similarly, only by ignoring the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada can Black obtain an
inverse relationship between the policy weights given to inflation and to
unemployment, as illustrated in his figure 6.2. Similarly, Black makes
much of rankings of coefficients in his estimated reaction functions, but
these rankings are not robust with respect to the choice of the policy
instrument, as can be seen by examining the results reported in his table
6.A.I and contrasting the rankings for the discount rate equation with
(say) the equation for required reserves as a percentage of domestic
credit.
The sensitivity of the results to the policy instrument suggests that it
would be useful to view policy as being implemented jointly through a
vector of controls, rather than trying to examine a single control variable
in isolation. A naive strategy would then be to employ multivariate
regression techniques to the vector of controls. But a better strategy
would be to model the broader aspects of the term "policy," as discussed
above, and to include measures of stability or instability and measures of
the ability of governments to precommit themselves to policy rules that
might avoid (or be solutions to) the problems of dynamic inconsistency
(discussed by Kydland and Prescott in the paper cited by Black). It would
also be important to model the changing constraints on government
policymakers that occur as a result of changes in the outside world or of
internal changes (Black would include these under changes in structure).
For example, policymakers may be forced to accept something close to
the world rate of inflation (with some modifications) if they choose a
regime of pegged exchange rates, and this world inflation rate may
change over time, leading to changes in the relationship between internal
economic variables measured by the econometrician and the values of
policy instruments.
The threshold regression technique discussed in Black's paper and
used to estimate the reaction functions deserves comment. First, the use
of the technique in this case does not seem to make much difference to the
results, as the factors by which the OLS coefficients are divided are very
nearly equal across countries. Certainly the rankings of coefficients are
not substantially affected by the technique. As a more general matter, the
technique seems rather limited in its usefulness. The general idea of
threshold regression is that the dependent variable equals some linear
function of observable variables plus a disturbance if the change in the232 Stanley W. Black
value of the dependent variable would in that case exceed some critical
value. Otherwise, the value of the dependent variable is unchanged (or,
more generally, it could equal some other function). The apparent
motivation for the technique is that some variables are observed to
undergo discrete changes and then to remain fixed for a time before
another discrete change occurs. But this observation does not imply that
threshold regression is an appropriate statistical technique for modeling
the behavior of the variable. There are at least three obvious alternatives
which may be preferable. First, the dependent variable could be modeled
as a Poisson process, and the independent variables could affect either
the probability of a jump over a time interval or the magnitude of the
jump if it occurs or both. This would lead to a substantially different
interpretation of the model than does threshold regression, and there are
tests that would allow the econometrician to distinguish between these
two models. Second, the probability of a change in the dependent vari-
able could be modeled rather than modeling the actual change and using
threshold regression. Under certain additional assumptions, this would
reduce to the Poisson model, but these additional assumptions are not
required. Third, one could explicitly develop a model that includes fixed
costs of altering the dependent variable. This seems to me to be the most
desirable alternative, particularly if the economist believes that some
fixed costs actually underlie the discrete changes in the variable being
modeled. The development of such a model would result in something
rather different than the equations that Black estimates, and different
than the threshold regression model. The reason is that policymakers
who are optimizing subject to some fixed costs of altering the policy
instrument will choose a different strategy for changing that instrument
than if there were no fixed costs. Expectations of future desired changes
in the instrument become more important and affect current decisions in
a new way. A policymaker who expects to desire another change in the
near future will be less likely to change the instrument today, and even if
he does, the fixed costs of making another change will affect the magni-
tude of the change he makes today. The inherently static decision-making
process in Black's paper would then have to be replaced by the policy rule
that follows from this inherently dynamic optimization problem.
It is important for economists to better understand the differences in
economic policy across different countries, just as it is important to
understand the differences in a single country over time. A theory of the
determination of economic policy should be able to explain both tempo-
ral and cross-sectional variation in policy. Unfortunately, we have little
understanding of the factors that determine these policy differences. One
reason is that the theoretically relevant definitions of policy, which in-
clude aspects of the stability of policymakers' behavior and aspects of the
ability to precommit to avoid time-inconsistency issues, have not yet been233 Monetary Policy for Internal and External Balance
successfully translated into operational terms for empirical work.
Another reason is the pervasive problem of identifying true structural
relationships in economics, as opposed to reduced-form relationships
that do not actually represent any person's behavior and would not
remain invariant to changes in other variables that may not be observed
by econometricians, nor invariant to other exogenous changes in condi-
tions. The difficulty of these problems is grounds for skepticism about the
ability of economists to explain observed differences in economic policy
in the near future.